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ExportPolicy and Performance,
1951-66
Thepreceding analysis of import control may now be complemented by
the analysis of export policy, to fill out the total picture of the anatomy of the
trade and exchange rate regime in India.1 Our analysis will embrace the period
195 1—66 although our main focus will be on the sub-period 1956—66. From
the viewpoint of the anatomy of export policy, it is useful to think of this sub-
period as divided into Phase I: 1956—62, and Phase II: 1962—66. The former
period is characterized by an essentially passive export policy; the latter by a
growing attempt at export subsidization to offset the effects of the overvalua-
tion of the exchange rate.
We shall begin with a brief analysis Of export performance during Phase I,
•but extend the period back to Phase IV, 1951—56, so as to draw on earlier
work by Manmohan Singh.2 Then, in considering Phase II, we shall draw on
the work of Bhagwati and Desai and throw into sharp relief the criteria of
export subsidization and the economic efficiency thereof. This period repre-
sents an ideal research area for understanding the anatomy of export subsidi-
zation in the context of an overvalued parity. The reader may further be re-
minded that in the present volume we extend the analysis of export policies and
performance to the post-1966 period in chapters 6, 7 and 9 in Part III, while
also examining the economic implications of improved export performance in
the framework of a computable planning model in Chapter 14 in Part IV.
5354 THE ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
EXPORT POLICY AND PERFORMANCE
DURING THE 1950s: PHASES IV AND I
The onset of the QR-regime and Phase I, during the Second Plan virtually
from its first year 1956—57, is now known to have been accompanied by a
significant deterioration in India's export performance. During the First Plan,
in Phase IV, the value of Indian exports had collapsed from its Korean War
peak in 1951 and had stagnated; and this stagnation continued until 1961,
implying a falling Indian share in world exports and a falling ratio of exports
to GNP.
This picture is only filled out, rather than substantially altered, if we
examine the behavior of export volumes and prices separately over the period.
Table 3—1 contains these estimates. These indicate strongly that the First Plan
period (Phase IV), while it showed on the average an improvement over the
previous three years' average export performance, largely achieved this
thanks to the large price gain during the two Korean War boom years, 1951
and 1952. On the other hand, there is a continuous though mild improvement
in the average export volume since 1952, which is masked in the value figures
because of the post-Korean War decline in prices. As against this, the Second
Plan period (Phase I) shows stagnation in both average prices and volume.
For the decade as a whole, leaving out the Korean War boom, the stagnation
in both average price and volume is quite striking.3
The picture that emerges from the aggregate behavior of export values,
volumes, and prices is reflected in the performance of individual commodities.
Table 3—2 shows the breakdown of Indian exports by principal commodities
through this decade. Table 3—3, containing estimates of the linear regression
equation xa + bt (with x as the export value and t as time) fitted to the
data on each item for 1952—53 through to 1960—61, shows that, except for
cashew kernels, iron ore and coffee, there is no upward trend of statistical sig-
nificance to be fountl in the export performance of any of the commodities.
Further, if we examine the principal export commodities, many of them
exhibit not merely a dismal rate of growth of earnings; they are also charac-
terized by a falling share in the world market. We note here that, in five major
export items adding up to over 50 percent of total export earnings—jute manu-
factures, tea, cotton textiles, vegetable oilseeds and oils and unmanufactured
tobacco—there was a discernible, and at times considerable, reduction in
India's share in world trade.4
The detailed analysis, by commodities, of India's faltering export per-
formance through the 1950s by Manmohan Singh has led Bhagwati and Desai
to conclude that, except for a few items such as iron ore, this decade's stagna-
tion of export earnings is to be largely attributed to domestic policies whichEXPORT POLICY AND PERFORMANCE, 195 1—66 55
TABLE 3-1
Export Earnings, Volume and Price Indices, 1948—66
, Value of Export Value Export Price Export Volume
Indian Exports Index Index Index
Calendar(U.S. $ Millions) (1958 =100) (1958 =[00) (1958 =100)
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1948 1363 112 90 124
1949 1309 107 90 119
1950 1146 94 98 97
1951 1611 132 143 96
1952 1295 106 117 89
1953 1116 91 100 92
1954 1182 97 102 94




1957 1379 101 110
1958 1221 100 100 100
1959 1308 107 100 107
1960 1331 109 109 101
1961 1387 114 111 105
1962 1403 115 106 112
1963 1631 134 106 126
1964 1749 143 106 134
1965 1686 138 112 124
1966 1606 132 111 119
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics, Supplement to 1966—67 issues, March
1968, International Monetary Fund.
frequently led to falling shares in India's traditional exports and an inadequate
expansion of new exports (in the absence of any export promotion on that
front)Thisanalysis is also supported broadly by our aggregative regression
analysis in Chapter 14 which underlines the role of domestic production and
availability (and hence of the price paid to producers which is a function of
the effective exchange rate on exports) in explaining the exports of important,
traditional items such as tea and jute textiles, and the probable role of the 1966
devaluation in explaining the improved performance of the new,
tional exports.
Bhagwati and Desai have made a notional calculation of the loss of ex-
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TABLE 3-3
Linear Regression Equations for Export Volume and Price
Indices and Selected Export Earnings, 1948—61
Estimated Coefficients and
Their Standard Errors
Item Regressed on Time Constant Regression
(Equation: x =a+ bi) Period Unit Term (a)Coefficient (b)
— (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Value of Indian exports1948—6 1Rs. millions1,289.11 1.80*
(78.33) (9.87)
2.Value of Indian exports1951—61Rs. millions1,319.98 _1.62*
(87.94) (12.97)
3. Value of Indian exports1953—61Rs. millions1,149.39 25.83
(45.10) (8.01)
4. Exportpriceindex 1948—611958= 100119.42 _1.54*
(7.63) (0.96)
5. Export price index 1951—611958 =100118.27 _1.77*
(7.95) (1.17)
6.Export price index 1953—611958 =100 97.33 1.07
(2.39) (0.42)
7. Export volume index 1948—611958 =100 88.58 1.44
(3.11) (0.39)
8. Export volume index 1951—611958 =100 91,61 1.41
(3.56) (0.52)
9.Exportvolumeindex 1953—611958= 100 98.89 1.02*
(4.30) (0.76)
10.Jute manufactures 1952—61Rs. millions1,220.07
(73.65) (13.09)
11. Tea 1952—61Rs. millions1,017.74 36.69*
(145.08) (25.78)
12. Cotton fabrics 1952—61Rs. millions635.33 _8.32*
(42.48) (7.55)
13. Vegetable oils 1952—61Rs. millions230.75 _14.88*
(67.95) (12.08)




1.6.Mica 1952—61Rs. millions 74.17 2.79
(5.85) (1.04)
1.7. Unmanufactured
tobacco 1952—61Rs. millions 109.60 3.94
(8.78) (1.56)
(continued)58 THE ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
TABLE 3—3 (concluded)






(Equation: x =a+ bi) Period Unit Term (a)Coefficient (b)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)












21. Spices 1952—61Rs. millions146.47
(35.23) (6.26)
22. Coir yarn and




23. Raw cotton 1952—61Rs. millions 184.61
(51.77) (9.20)
24. Lac 1952—61Rs. millions 96.02
(14.92) (2.65)








NOTE: Values of the regression coefficient marked with an asterisk are not significant
at the 5 percent level of significance.
SouRcE: Rows 1—9 calculated from Table 1—1; rows 10—26 calculated from Table
3—2. Reproduced from Bhagwati and Desai, India, p. 373.
suming the 1948—50 shares for the major commodities—jute manufactures,
tea, cotton textiles, groundnuts, linseed oils and oilseeds and tobacco—and
assuming that unit values and world volumes would not have changed from the
observed levels each year, they have worked out the hypothetical earnings that
would have accrued to India. They treat these as somewhat optimistic esti-
mates, as it is probable that attempts by India at maintaining her share (in
jute and tea, in particular) would, in many cases, have tended to depress the
unit
Their resulting estimates are reproduced in Table 3—4. They are quite
striking. The overall improvement in feasible export earnings, over the ten
years 1951—60, comes for these five commodities to around 16.5 percent of
the actual performance. If we add to the estimated improvement of Rs.5,740
million a rough estimate of the potential improvement in three other items—EXPORT POLICY AND PERFORMANCE, 1951—66 59
coffee,manganese ore and leather—we get close to an overall figure of about
ks.6,200 million.7
In Chapter 14, we shall examine how far policies resulting in such an
improved export performance might have helped improve also India's economic
performance. Immediately, however, we proceed to analyze the salient features
of the export promotion efforts mounted during 1962—66, the period which
constituted Phase II.
ExPoRT POLICY AND PERFORMANCE FROM
1962 TO 1966: PHASE II
The policy of neglect of the export sector was rationalized later as "export
pessimism." It characterized Phase I during the Second Five-Year Plan and
was to give way during the Third Five-Year Plan to an escalating policy of
export subsidization. By 1966, the subsidies embraced a large fraction of
India's exports and included substantial rates; the period 1962—66 was thus
clearly Phase II. The total export performance during this period improved in
consequence of these subsidies and as a result of an expansion of trade with
the socialist bloc (Table 3—5).
Thesuccess of the subsidies in countervailing the e:ffects of the overvalued
exchange rate and promoting exports was obvious in relation to the emerging
exports of new manufactures and did much to counter the export pessimism
which partly underlay the Second Plan but was also largely the product of that
Plan's poor export performance.
But, while the subsidization reduced the average degree of overvaluation,
one of its remarkable features was that it was as selective, chaotic and cost-
unconscious as the process of automatic protection for import substitution.
Thus, the subsidization was relatively energetic; but it was not efficient in the
neoclassical sense and, as many instances of value-subtraction (at international
prices) strongly underlined, wasteful in consequence.
In this section, therefore, we describe briefly the methods of export subsi-
dization and analyze their efficiency implications. In particular, our discussion
will indicate why the June 1966 devaluation was announced: essentially to
enable the government to sweep away the chaotic and inefficient pattern of
subsidization and replace it with the uniform and stable export incentive
implied by the devaluation.
Policies of Export Subsidization.
Export subsidization policies took essentially two major forms:(1)
fiscal measures, and (2) import entitlement schemes (which entitled exporters
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TABLE 3-5



































































SOURCE: Basic Statistical Material Relating to Foreign Trade, Production and Prices,
Volume XIII—Part II, Government of India, 1967. Reproduced from Bhagwati and
Desai, India, p. 397, with minor corrections and expression of percentages to two decimal
places.
improved the direct profitability of export sales, there were also some promo-
tional activities, in the form, for example, of budgetary appropriations for
market development, which indirectly raised the profitability of foreign sales
to domestic producers and traders.
FISCAL MEASURES
Among the fiscal measures which the export drive was based on were:
(1) exemptions from sales taxes on final sales and refunds of indirect taxes,
domestic and customs, on inputs; (2) direct tax concessions; (3) outright
subsidies; and (4) rail freight concessions.
1. Exemptions and refunds from indirect taxes(sales, customs and
excise) were generally made available to Indian exporters, although their
incidence was not always as intended owing to dilatory procedures and ineffi-
ciencies. These exemptions, refunds and rebates applied to both imported
components and to exported outputs.EXPORT POLICY AND PERFORMANCE, 195 1—66 63
Drawbacks of import duties were introduced for raw materials used in
exported finished articles (including art silk fabrics, cars, dry radio batteries,
electric fans and cigarettes) in 1954. Rebates of excis.e duty were announced
in 1956, with immediate applicability to the raw materials used in exported
ready-made apparel, tents, and sugar products and to direct exports of cotton
and silk fabrics produced on powerlooms. The scope of both these measures
was considerably enlarged during the 1960s, though several inefficiencies of
procedure and insufficient accessibility to the drawbacks and rebates persisted
through the ensuing years. The exemptions from sales taxes raised even more
difficulties in practice.
While no breakdown of the refunds, rebates, and drawbacks actually
earned on different export items is available, it is estimated that the refund of
excise duties in 1963—64 was around Rs. 58 million.
2. More important were the direct tax concessions, which had been made
in three successive budgets. The first, and somewhat hesitant, step was taken
with the 1962 budget which gave a non-discriminatory tax concession to
exporters. Apart from its non-selectivity, the subsidy was characterized by its
being calculated on profits from exports (with the tax rate being fixed thereon
at 45 percent instead of the standard 50 percent).
The 1963 budget added a different kind of tax. incentive. It was both
selective and related, not to profits, but directly to the f.o.b. value of exports—
at 2 percent thereof.
The 1965 budget took the further striking step of giving selective con-
cessions, described as tax credits, at di/Jerent rates to different industries. The
rates went up to as far as 15 percent and were extended to a larger number of
industries. Yet, in relation to the import entitlement schemes which are dis-
cussed below, the incentives were relatively small and confined to a small
range of exports.
3. In addition to the tax concessions granted through the budget, which
therefore must be classified as subsidy equivalents, there were two other major
forms of subsidization in the system: (a) open, cash subsidy by budgetary
appropriation for sugar; and (b) disguised cash subsidy, in the shape of losses
incurred by the STC on exports of certain commodities, which were "financed"
by profits on other (essentially import) trade.
4. With respect to rail freight concessions, as early as 1960 the Ministry
of Railways had agreed to grant reductions in freight rates to selected com-
modities for transportation between specified destinations. The commodities
covered ranged from motor vehicle batteries and oil pressure lamps to textile
machinery and bicycles: they were essentially non-agriculture-based manufac-
tures whose exports were a recent phenomenon.
An examination of the eligible routes and corresponding concessions
indicates that the intention was to offset the transport cost "disadvantage" to64 THE ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
exporters, even sometimes to the point of providing progressively concessional
rates as distance increased (as with manganese ore)! As the export drive
intensified, this aspect of rail freight concessions was to have more appeal for
the authorities in charge of export promotion, despite its contradiction
of economic logic. The notion that transport costs may reflect real costs to the
economy and the fact that, if anything, the "shadow" freight rates were almost
certainly higher than those charged on a non-concessional basis, seem to have
concerned none of the authorities in charge of the export drive.
In addition to these direct fiscal measures, involving explicit or implicit
subsidization of exports, at budgetary expense, there were also (a) budgetary
grants for promotional activities, such as the Market Development Fund,
under which the activities of the numerous Export Promotion Councils were
financed along with research exhibitions and market surveys geared to export
expansion, and (b) special allocations of scarce items at controlled prices,
including priority access to rail space and allocations of domestic materials,
such as iron and steel, which constituted effective subsidization insofar as these
facilities and materials, if purchased at (black) market prices, would have
been otherwise more expensive.
IMPORT ENTITLEMENT SCHEMES
While the export promotion measures deployed by the Indian Govern-
ment had, therefore, numerous aspects (including outright subsidies and tax
concessions), the principal instrument of export promotion soon became the
import entitlement schemes, under which eligible exporters received import
licenses, fetching high import premia, pro rata to the value of exports effected.
By early 1965 the import entitlement schemes already had a very considerable
coverage.
The rates of import entitlements.Even a cursory examination of the
rates schedules for import entitlements under the export promotion schemes
(as, for example, for engineering and chemicals) shows that wide variations
existed in these rates for different products. When the criterion used for fixing
these rates was sought, governmental declarations seemed to yield definitive
answers. Take, for example, a typical statement:8
The most important feature of these schemes is that a specified per-
centage of the f.o.b. value of exports is allowed to be used for importing
raw materials and components required in the production of the export
products or a group of allied products. The import entitlement is generally
determined on the basis of twice the import content subject to a maximum
of 75 per cent of the f.o.b. value of exports.
Two central principles seemed to emerge from these and other declara-
tions: (1) the import entitlement would not exceed 75 percent of f.o.b. exportEXPORT POLICY AND PERFORMANCE, 1951—66 65
value; and (2) the import entitlement would, subject to the preceding con-
straint, equal only twice the value of import content.
As it turned out, however, neither of these principles appears to have
been taken seriously since the intensification of the export drive began during
1963. Why were they so clearly flouted? It appears as though the authorities
initially thought that some uniform incentive should be provided and this
uniformity was thought to be present in the rule of twice-the-import-content
on the ground that each exporter could thus earn one extra import-content to
produce one more unit for domestic sale. Of course, this does not at all mean
a uniform ad valorem incentive to export for all commodities covered by such
a scheme; but that does not appear to have been appreciated. At the same
time, the ceiling of 75 percent of f.o.b. value appears to have been imposed
for any or all of the following reasons: (1) the schemes were supposed to
yield net foreign exchange for non-exporting industries and hence entitlements
in excess of 100 percent seemed ruled out; (2) an excessive entitlement might
encourage over-invoicing of exports; and perhaps (3) larger entitlements
would result in "throw-away" exports.
The general flouting of the 75 percent ceiling and the twice-the-import-
content rule appears to have been a reflection of the shift in practice to the
notion that the value of exports must generally be maximized and that uni-
formity of the kind implicit in the twice-the-import-content rule, as well as
any ceiling on the entitlements, must not be taken so seriously as to impede
the export drive. These attitudes were evident also in the growing number of
concessions granted for rail transport and the accelerating clamor even for
(economically) perverse rules under which the concessional rates would be
linked directly with the distance over which the goods must be carried. We
shall revert to this point later, when we evaluate the economic effects of the
entitlement schemes.
Permissible imports.Unlike some exchange retention schemes, the
import entitlement schemes did not permit free use of the entitlements. Invari-
ably, a list of authorized imports was issued. An analysis of these lists and
accompanying official declarations shows several features.
1. The imports allowed were claimed to be direct inputs into the indus-
tries covered by the exports promotion scheme in question. This was generally
correct; but there were important qualifications:
(a) Since different industries were frequently grouped together into a
single scheme, the directness of the importable inputs, as far as any one indus-
try was concerned, could not be considered to be really maintained by the
scheme.
(b) Similarly, from the viewpoint of the exporting manufacturer, if he
was a multi-product manufacturer and the different products had interchange-
able materials, the directness of the imported inputs into the exported product66 THE ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
surely did not rule out in practice their use for manufacture of the other
unexported products within the same firm.
(c) Moreover, as many materials (especially chemicals) go into a large
range of industries, thus straddling different export promotion schemes, and
as the legal transferability of entitlements frequently occurred via traders, it is
only natural that illegal, inter-scheme transfers also occurred from time to time.
(d) Finally, the "directness" principle was openly flouted eventually by
the introduction of the special dryfruits scheme under which ad hoc licenses
were given to exporters of diverse items (including chemicals and engineering
poducts) to import high-premium-yielding dryfruit. This scheme amounted
of course to nothing but an indirect method of cash subsidization and no
pretense could be made of dryfruit being a direct input into the exported items.
2. There were, further, occasional changes of items in permissible imports
of materials and components. There appears to have been a conflict between
the interests of the exporters and those of the domestic producers of materials
competing with imports. Exporters sought to include high-premia materials,
whereas domestic producers of these materials opposed this because inclusion
in the permissible imports list would reduce their profits. In a sheltered market
these conflicts assumed economic significance, and the occasional shifts in
items on the import list seemed often to reflect the relative bargaining positions
of the pressure groups involved rather than significant changes in objective
economic conditions.
3. In the beginning, the use of entitlements was further restricted to the
import of materials, spares and components, while the import of capital goods
for replacing or extending capacity was excluded. This restriction was probably
prompted by a desire not to disrupt Capital Goods (Import) Control (CGC),
although of course there was no reason why permission to import equipment
could not be allowed, subject to prior approval by CGC. Yet another reason
may have been that the influential policy-makers really .regarded the entitle-
ment schemes as more or less breaking the bottlenecks to exports arising from
inability to use current capacity because of scarcity of imported materials and
did not fully appreciate the subsidy aspect of the schemes or the possibility
that expansion of capacity in the export industries itself might be desirable from
the viewpoint of export promotion. These restrictions, however, were gradually
reduced and, in some cases, altogether eliminated, so that it became customary
eventually to have large proportions of the entitlement specified as expendable
on imports of equipment.
Transferability of import entitlements.While import entitlements had
earlier been subjected to extremely stringent restrictions concerning transfera-
bility and sale, they eventually became more readily saleable although several
restrictions continued. Several variants of transferability were employed in the
different schemes.EXPORT POLICY AND PERFORMANCE, 1951—66 67
Atypical formula, widely used, permitted the entitlement to be trans-
ferred by the exporter, who might be a trader or a manufacturer-exporter, to
other manufacturers covered by the same entitlement scheme. Among other
variants the transferability of the engineering scheme, for example, was
restricted within each of three groups: (1) general engineering and electrical
manufactures; (2) machinery and transport equipment; and (3) non-ferrous
semis, alloys and fully processed manufactures. In fish, products, handicrafts,
processed goods, leather and leather manufactures, silk fabrics and ready-
made silk garments, again the transferability of imports was confined to other
exporters within the scheme and does not appear to have been extended to all
manufacturers. For dyes and chemicals entitlements in art silk exports, on the
other hand, transferability extended even to units in cotl;on and woolen textiles.
Premium on entitlements.Thus import entitlements were generally
transferable within a scheme and could earn whatever premium cleared the
market at any point of time. Occasionally, indeed not infrequently, ceilings
were imposed on the chargeable premium.
In the bulk of the entitlements issued, the effective subsidization to any
exporter depended on the premium on the entitlements (in addition, of course,
to the entitlement rate itself)Inpractice, the segmentation of the different
entitlement markets meant that the level of the premium varied from com-
modity to commodity. Besides, the premium varied over time, within each
market. The factors which must have determined the premium included the
restrictiveness of the permissible imports list, the entitlement rate, the leakage
into prohibited sales and expectations about the current and future inflow of
entitlements into the market.1°
Changes and variability in the export incentive offered by the entitlements
schemes.So far we have considered the questions of the fixation of entitle-
ment rates, the transferability of the entitlements and the premium on entitle-
ments. From this, it is easy to infer the effective subsidy which was available,
at a single point of time, on export sales to an atornistic exporter. But the
question remains whether this export incentive tended to be variable, with the
effective subsidy on exports changing from time to time.
There is little doubt that the export incentives were variable under the
entitlement schemes, although it is difficult to quantify this variability accu-
rately in view of the paucity of reliable information for many schemes. There
were three major reasons why such variability arose:
1. changes in the coverage of the schemes
(a) products were included and/or excluded from period to period;
and
(b) exports to certain areas were excluded arid/or their entitlements
were changed from time to time;68 THE ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
2. changes in entitlement for given products, arising from changes in
formula used or revised notions about the incentives, from time to time;
and
3. changes in the premium on the entitlements, arising from:
(a) revisions in rules governing the transferability of entitlements; or
(b) changes in the coverage of the items for whose import the entitle-
ments could be used; or
(c) inevitable, periodic shifts in the premium which entitlement li-
censes (with given coverage and transferability)enjoyed in the
market; or any combination of all of these factors.
In conclusion, the Indian export promotion policies were based essentially
on the entitlement schemes which applied by 1965—66, in significant degree,
to nearly 60 percent of Indian export earnings, although the magnitude of
export subsidization they involved was unforeseeably discriminatory in in-
cidence among the different items.11
Economic Effects ol Import Entitlement Schemes.
We now turn to an analysis of the main economic features and con-
sequences of these import entitlement schemes, which (as noted) constituted
the bulk of India's export subsidization effort until the June 1966 devaluation.
To begin with, in contrast to the simple exchange retention schemes of coun-
tries such as Pakistan, the Indian schemes had the following, almost unique
features:
1. the number of entitlement rates was very large and subject to occa-
sional change;
2. by and large, the entitlement rates were below 100 percent of export
value;
3. the market for the (transferable) entitlements was segmented by
export promotion schemes;
4. the premium on entitlements showed fluctuations in the different,
segmented markets;
5.thelist of permissible imports excluded consumer goods;
6. the value of exports covered by the scheme, on the most liberal in-
terpretation which would include tea and coffee exports, amounted to around
80 percent of the total Indian exports and to around 60 percent on more
restricted assumptions; and
7.thevalue of imports coming under entitlements was throughout less.
than 5percentof the total value of imports (including aid-financed imports).
The import entitlement schemes, set in the framework of an overvalued
exchange rate, were undoubtedly a useful improvement on a situation where
otherwise exports were being seriously discriminated against. But the essentialEXPORT POLICY AND PERFORMANCE, 1951—66 69
questionis whether these were an efficient way of countering the effect of
the overvaluation of the exchange rate on exports. The analysis that follows
in this chapter is addressed to this question and seeks to establish the in-
efficiency of such schemes.
As the Indian import entitlement schemes were characterized by consider-
able segmentation, differential rates and non-transferability resulting in dif-
ferential premia, we shall analyze the efficiency of these schemes (1) on the
hypothetical assumption that these markets and rates were unified and (2)
on the more realistic assumption that the markets and rates were differentiated.
We will, in fact, be arguing that these schemes were basically an inefficient
way of simulating the working of a flexible exchange rate system; and that
these inefficiencies were compounded by the differential nature of the effec-
tive subsidization granted under the Indian regime.
SUBSIDY ASPECTS PER SE
Among the several, significant effects of the Indian import entitlement
schemes, omitting (as we have noted) the aspect of differential rates and Se-
lectivity in general, we shall note the following main features: over-invoicing
of exports; revenue effect; self-limiting export promotion; instability of the in-
centive offered; utilization of foreign exchange allocations explicitly for creating
incentives; and welfare effects.
Over-invoicing of exports.Insofar as the import entitlement schemes con-
stituted subsidy measures, they gave rise to an incentive, ceteris paribus, to
over-invoice exports: an incentive that would be eliminated under a straight-
forward, direct adjustment of the exchange rate (which would obviate the
need to subsidize exports to counter the disincentive offered to exports by the
overvaluation of the exchange rate)
Wemust note here that the incentive to over-invoice led some exporters,
especially (though not exclusively) in sectors such as plastics and art silks,
to send out shoddy goods with faked, higher-price declarations, which were
cleared in foreign markets at "what they could fetch." At a time when India's
immediate and long-term export drive had to rest increasingly on the export
of manufactures (and, for that matter, quality and complex manufactures by
and large), the building up of goodwill was quite important. This was pre-
cisely what was jeopardized by the practitioners of over-invoicing. We shall
soon see that the instability of the incentive offered by the entitlement schemes,
combined with the differential incidence of the benefits on the numerous,
different items, accentuated this phenomenon by encouraging the entry into
the export trade of roving traders, in search of quick profits, whose primary
objective was short-run, immediate profit maximization.
Revenue effects.An argument frequently advanced in India in favor of
1:he import entitlement schemes, as a method of export subsidization, as against
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paid by the users of the import licenses. However, insofar as thisis the
case, it would be equally open for the authorities to levy such a tax directly
on imports and to finance therewith a direct subsidy on exports. Hence, the
argument in favor of the entitlement schemes must rest on the illusion that
taxation of imports may be feasible if disguised but not otherwise. Such an
illusion may well exist, but we doubt its plausibility and have seen no evidence
in support thereof.
Besides, we may note that if we were to compare a regime with an over-
valued exchange rate combined with entitlement schemes for export, with an
adjusted exchange rate, the revenue effect would have been against the former
regime for the simple reason that imports exceeded exports approximately
by the amount of the net aid inflow which was quite considerable.
Self-limiting nature of the subsidy.Further, the entitlement schemes con-
trasted unfavorably with direct, ad valorem, subsidies in another respect.
Whereas ad valorem subsidies apply the incentive equally at all levels of export
(and concomitant prices), the entitlement schemes build into their structure
an important feature which reduces the incentive with the value of exports
achieved.
This self-limiting aspect, implying that the more successful the scheme
is in increasing exports, the less the incentive to export at the margin, arises
from the fact that the incentive rests crucially on the entitlement premium
(once the entitlement rate is fixed). If export value increases, thanks to the
entitlement schemes, import entitlements entering the market will proportion-
ately increase, thus tending to push the premium down. But the lower the
premium the lower also the incentive, at the margin, on exports.
An ad valorem subsidy instead would maintain the full incentive. A
flexible exchange rate or suitable devaluation, on the other hand, would have
effects similar to an ad valorem subsidy, except for the incremental cost of
imported and import-competing inputs which would operate with respect to
the import side.
Instability of the incentive.A related feature of such export subsidization
schemes is the additional source of instability that they constitute, in view of
the fact that the premium on entitlements would vary, in contrast to an ad
valorem export subsidy. Moreover, as we have already noted, the frequent
changes in the premia brought about by changing rules concerning permissible
imports and transferability, for example, as also frequent changes in the en-
titlement rates themselves, constituted further elements of instability in the
operation of the entitlement schemes in India.
Utilization of foreign exchange allocations for creating export incentives.
The economic consequences and inefficiencies that we have just discussed
arose primarily from the fact that the entitlement schemes operated by divert-
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and incentive, to exporters. Among the other effects of such a policy, we may
now note two in. particular.
(1) The system may have resulted in foreign exchange being allocated
to industries (which albeit were induced thereby to export) for non-priority
use. FOr example, if imports of luxury goods were permitted under the entitle-
ments schemes, and this was merely to provide a high-premium incentive
for export, and the import of luxury goods was otherwise intended to be pro-
hibited, this could well be regarded as a minus factor in the evaluation of the
entitlement schemes (from the point of view of this policy). On the other
hand, if the government did not seek to prohibit imports of these luxury
goods or if they were merely diverted from established importers to import
entitlements, the foreign exchange used (via the entitlements) on importing
these luxury goods could not be properly regarded as "misallocation" from the
viewpoint of socially declared objectives. Thus, for example, the Pakistan
bonus scheme has permitted imports of consumer goods (including luxury
goods), but so has their general, import licensing policy.
On the other hand, the Indian entitlement schemes, as we have noted,
followed exclusively the principle of exclusion of consumer goods. Where,
however, the leakage into non-priority allocations ma.y be alleged to have
occurred is in industries such as art silk where the total foreign exchange
allocations (AU plus import entitlement licenses), as a result of the export
incentive taking the form of import entitlements rather than ad valorem sub-
sidies, may have been greater than otherwise. In the absence of any statistical
evidence on AU licenses by sector-of-use (for any length of time, for this in-
dustry),itisimpossible to arrive at any reasonably firm conclusion on
1;his question.
(2) Another effect of the use of foreign exchange allocations for pro-
moting exports, in the Indian context, was quite favorable (although it
would have ceased to be so under an adjusted exchange rate which could
obviate the reliance on strict import controls and the resulting inflexibility).
Until these entitlement schemes were operating, there was practically no legal
way of getting hold of foreign exchange in order to break expensive bottle-
necks and unforeseen demands. The entitlement markets thus served to intro-
duce a much needed flexibility in an otherwise excessively inflexible system.
While this basic advantage to the economy, arising from the introduction
of legal accessibility to scarce imports (albeit with restrictions, butstill
significant), was considerable, many exporters who were interviewed argued
that the entitlement schemes, in view of their granting such access to imports,
were also a superior, more effective way of sustaining an export drive than
ad valorem financial subsidies. (1) It was argued that flexibility of access
foreign exchange was a considerable advantage, which would not be avail-
able if the subsidy was a financial one; and that their export performance72 THE ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
would have been affected adversely by the replacement of these schemes by
financial subsidies.13 (2) It was further argued that the vast majority of ex-
porting producers exported just enough to get the amount of foreign exchange
for maintaining full capacity utilization in their plants and that their motiva-
tion in exporting was not to increase overall profits but to expand capacity
utilization; and hence the export drive would suffer by the replacement of
entitlement schemes by purely financial incentives. (3) Finally, it was also
claimed that, with foreign exchange not otherwise available in a free market,
it was possible that firms which might find it attractive to export on being
given a financial incentive to do so, might not be in a position to produce at
all for export (the assumption, of course, being that their AU allocations
were meager).
While these beliefs were strongly held, only the last argument has some
element of logic in it. The first argument is fallacious because any advantage
following from flexibility can generally be quantified and the corresponding
incentive provided through fiscal subsidies.'4 As for the second argument,
there is little evidence of Indian firms following a policy of output, rather
than profit, expansion. The very fact that many firms were known to sell
their entitlement licenses, at least at the margin, indicates that the force of
this argument is not considerable. The last argument, based on the fact that
firms restricting themselves to legal purchases would not be able to produce
for export, but would have to confine themselves to diverting existing pro-
duction to exports, has some plausibility. Even in this case, however, we
have to allow for the fact that incremental export earnings would be released
into the economy and hence could be used eventually for augmenting pro-
duction for exports. We are thus left essentially with the argument that the
entitlement schemes introduced flexibility into the import regime, undoubtedly
resulting in sizable gains via the breaking of costly bottlenecks.
Other welfare effects.We may now consider other more direct welfare
effects associated with the fact that the entitlement schemes involved a de-
parture from unified exchange rates. As already noted, an ad valorem subsidy
on exports would help, in an overvalued exchange rate situation, to reduce
the discrimination against exports. On the other hand, a system under which
export subsidization is combined with an overvalued exchange rate involv-
ing import controls differs significantly from a system where the exchange
rate is altered to equilibrium levels and thus implies a unified exchange
rate policy.
Thus, in the Indian-type import regime, we have already observed that
imports were partly allocated on an AU basis and hence the effective rate
on these imports was the parity plus the relevant tariff. On the other hand,
insofar as other inputs were purchased from the market, the effective import
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at.length in Chapter 13, there followed non-unified exchange rates and un-
predictably different and bizarre incentives for resource allocation.
In this situation, the introduction of even a unified export subsidy
would have perpetuated the continuation of non-unified exchange rates, while
helping to reduce the overall disincentive to exports. But, in fact, such a
subsidy would give rise to the possibility of losses arising from the effective
export rate for a commodity exceeding the effective average import rate on
its inputs. Such a situation could lead to the possibility mentioned earlier
that the process would yield "value subtracted" at international prices.
SELECTIVITY OF THE SUBSIDIZATION
In point of fact, many of the inefficiencies resulting from the entitlement
schemes were compounded by the selectivity with which they were adminis-
tered and from which we have so far been abstracting.
Undoubtedly, in an ideal world, one should want to make rational
departures from unified exchange rates. There are, in fact, a vast number of
grounds on which we can argue for optimal intervention in the shape of trade
tariffs and subsidies and tax-cum-subsidies on production, consumption, and
factor—use.
However, the Indian export subsidization schemes involved policy inter-.
vention in a selective manner, with little economic rationale. As argued
earlier, the principle apparently aimed at in the beginning was the supply
of one more unit of "import-content," in addition to "replacement," as the
economic incentive for export promotion. The equivalent ad valorem subsidy,
therefore, would have varied among different export commodities and, con-
verted into different ad valorem rates of import entitlements for different com-
modities, it did. The effective export subsidy further varied among commodi-
ties because, for administrative reasons and as a result of notions about
priorities in some undefined sense, the entitlement licenses could be marketed,
as we have already seen, only within segmented markets and hence carried
differential premia.
In point of fact, toward 1965—66, the principle of export subsidization
had clearly begun to veer around to the proposition that exports should be
maximized—although, we should not forget that, on many traditional exports
which were outside the range of such export subsidization, domestic absorp-
tion continued to create difficulties in the way of more successful export
promotion.
The principle of maximizing exports, which became fairly widespread
among the newer manufactures, was practiced by a continuous tendency to-
ward raising the effective subsidization. Also, for example, it became gener-
ally possible to ask the Ministry of International Trade for ad hoc entitle-
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difference between the domestic sale price of a product and its supposed
f.o.b. export price plus the subsidy normally available through drawbacks,
fiscal tax concessions, and entitlements. In addition, we have also noted how
transport freight concessions were sought, and sometimes granted, to com-
pensate for "transport cost disadvantage" to products manufactured in the
hinterland. The fact that transport involves a real cost to the economy and
hence must be accounted for, instead of being compensated for, was appar-
ently forgotten in the general strategy of pushing out any and all of the new
exports in particular.
Thus, the policy of export promotion generally adopted during the
Third Plan period, ending in the devaluation of June 1966, can best be
described as having ultimately become one of indiscriminate export promo-
tion, with even a perverse bias toward fixing the subsidy inversely to the
competitive strength of the exportable commodity. This system had its counter-
part in the indiscriminate protection that import policy furnished to domestic
industries.
It is thus difficult to escape the conclusion that, while the Third Plan
witnessed a major shift toward export subsidization, export promotion poli-
cies were inefficiently designed and implemented. These policies were to
be subjected to change in the direction of greater efficiency with devalua-
tion in June 1966. We discuss these changes in Part III. But first we proceed,
in the next chapter, to discuss the other measures, such as use of import
duties to mop up premia, which were also undertaken during the latter part of
Phase II, prior to the June 1966 devaluation and associated policy changes.
NOTES
1. The discussion in this chapter is an abridged version of Bhagwati and Desai,
India, pp. 371—467.
2. Manmohan Singh, india's Export Trends(Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1964).
3. The regression equation xa + bi, fitted to the price and volume indices for
the periods 1948—61, 1951—61 and 1953—61 confirms the statistical significance of this
stagnation. The estimated equations are reproduced in Table 3—3.
4. Singh, Export Trends.
5. Bhagwati and Desai, India, p. 394.
6. On the other hand, the "negative" entries in Table 3—4 show that the 1948—50
average was by no means the highest feasible share, even in the ensuing decade, for
cotton textiles, tobacco, groundnut, and linseed oilseed and oils.
7. Bhagwati and Desai, India, pp. 394—395.
8. Annual Report, 1963—64, Government of India, Ministry of International Trade,
New Delhi, p. 14.
9. Here, as elsewhere, we are referring only to the incentive provided an individual,
atomistic exporter under the entitlement schemes. It would be incorrect to generalize the
argument to the point of saying that therefore the replacement of such a scheme by an
identical ad valorem export subsidy would produce equivalent real effects.EXPORT POLICY AND PERFORMANCE, 1951—66 75
10.For example, the premia rose severely for these licenses during May—June 1965,
when the import policy announcement was delayed and the removal of the entitlement
schemes was widely expected. This happened again in the months prior to devaluation in
June 1966.
11. For further evidence in support of this conclusion, see Bhagwati and Desai,
India, pp. 428—430. The figure of 80 percent there exceeds the figure of 60 percent here
because it includes nearly negligible entitlements given to items such as tea and jute.
12. Whether over-invoicing would be worthwhile would depend, of course, on the
relative values of the black market foreign exchange rate and the degree of export subsi-
dization. In India, the incentive to over-invoice was clearly present in many cases.
13. This assertion, of course, is an important indictment of the import control regime
andtheinflexibility it entailed.
14. We presume that necessary production would be feasible under the export sub-
sidy solution.